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ABSTRACT

The most recent push for patent reform established competing groups supporting
individual agendas. In view of current economic difficulties, however, the focus on
innovation should be ever more important. By enacting the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980,
the federal government invested in innovation and unlocked American industrial
potential through Universities.
The current reform has provisions that limit
disclosure and facilitate patent challenging which increases costs to inventors and
adds responsibilities to an already overloaded patent office. This article addresses a
number of the proposed reforms and the effect on University innovation.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the past several years, Congress has dedicated significant time and effort
to modify United States patent law.1 During the 110th Congress (2007-2008), the
House of Representatives passed a bill known as the "Patent Reform Act of 2007,"2
but the bill died in the Senate.3 In September 2008, a new bill was introduced in the
Senate by Honorable Jon Kyl. 4 The authors of the failed Senate bill and the
proponents of patent reform vowed that reform legislation would be re-introduced
and enacted in 2009.5 In the interim, between the close of the 110th Congress, the
transfer of power to a new Congress with increased Democratic majorities and the
historic inauguration of a new President, the world has seen a meltdown of the global
financial markets unlike anything that has occurred since the Great Depression.6 On
March 3, 2009, both the House and the Senate introduced strikingly similar patent
reform bills, both entitled Patent Reform Act of 2009. 7 As we write this article, the
global financial crisis continues and most experts suggest that the U.S. economy will
not begin to recover until at least the third quarter of 2009-if then.8 The economic
environment is markedly different than that which existed just a few short months
ago. 9 Thus, it is fair to ask whether the urgency of patent reform or the types of
reform that were being sought presented in 2008 are suitable for the new challenges

* Carl E. Gulbrandsen is the managing director of the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
("WARF"), the patent management organization for the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Stephanie Adamany is associate general counsel of WARF. Sandra Haberny, Ph.D. and Jason
Sheasby are attorneys at Irell & Manella LLP. Correspondence or questions may be directed to
carl@warf.org. The opinion of the authors should not be interpreted as those of their employers.
1 Soo Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009,
S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008) (terminating in
the Senate); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed House of
Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007) (terminating
in the Senate).
2 H.R. 1908; see 153 CONG. REC. D1,173 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (passing H.R. 1908).
3 See S. 1145 (as placed on Senate Legislative Calendar No. 563, January 24, 2008).
154 CONG. REC. S9,493 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008).

5 See, e.g., Rick Merritt,

Congress to Again Take Up Patent Reform, ELECTRONIC

ENGINEERING
TIMES,
Jan.
26,
2009,
at
30,
available at http://www.eetimes.com/
showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=212902084 ("A spokesman for Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) confirmed
his plans to bring up patent reform in the current session ..
").

6 See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Obama Urged to Move Swiftly to Rescue Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2009, at A20 ("The financial meltdown is the most serious to confront a new president since
Franklin D. Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933.').
7 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009,
S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009).
8 Kelly Evans & Phil Izzo, Economists' US. Outlook Dims, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2009, at A4,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123445757254678091.html.

9 Id.
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this country now faces. 10 Too little attention has been given to the adverse effect the
proposed reforms have on innovation at a time when innovation is critical to
economic recovery.11
The current effort to reform patent law saw its genesis in numerous scholarly
articles and studies. 12 More recently, the major driver for reform has been a coalition
of large information technology and financial service companies acting collectively
through the Coalition for Patent Fairness ("CPF").13 The principal complaint of this
coalition is that alleged dubious claims of patent infringement are being made which
results in rising litigation costs for coalition members. 14 The coalition contends that
this circumstance is due to an increasing number of "low quality patents."1 5 More

10 See id.; ROBERT J. SHAPIRO & APARNA MATHUR, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF PATENT
REFORM: THE DEFICIENCIES AND COSTS OF PROPOSALS REGARDING THE APPORTIONMENT OF
DAMAGES, POST-GRANT OPPOSITION, AND INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 1 (2008), available at

http://www.bio.org/reg/media/patent-reform-study.pdf.
11See IEEE-USA, PATENT REFORM:
U.S. INNOVATION, ENTREPRENEURIALISM AND
COMPETITIVENESS 3 (2009), http://www.ieeeusa.org/policy/positions/patentreform.pdf (last visited
Mar. 30, 2009); see also SEED, REPORT FROM DUBAI, at 111 (Feb. 2009) ("Traditionally when the
economy goes bad, everyone cuts down on science and R&D ... the message from this forum was this
time it should be the other way around, that new knowledge and innovation are the way out of this
crisis.").
12 See, e.g., COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN GENOMIC AND PROTEIN RESEARCH AND
INNOVATION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC
RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephen A.
Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006); COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003) [hereinafter FTC REPORT],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf, Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges,
Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents.* Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office
Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004);
Mark A Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Frontiers of Intellectual Property Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The First-to-InventRule in the US.
Patent System Has Provided No Advanntage to Small Entities, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
514 (2005).
13 See Katie Kindlean & Matthew Murray, Patent Push, ROLL CALL, Feb. 25, 2009, at 9
(reporting that the CPF is urging Congress to enact 2009 patent reform); Patent Fairness Coalition,
http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/about/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
14Letter from Coal. for Patent Fairness to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Arlen Specter, United
States Senator, Lamar S. Smith, United States Representative (February 24, 2009), available at
http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/CPF-letter to CongressFeb.pdfe see Perspectives on Patents.
Post-grant Review Procedures and Other Litigation Reforms: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Property,S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 40-45 (2006) [hereinafter Chandler
Statement] (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Cisco
Systems, Inc.).
15See Chandler Statement, supra note 14, at 40-45. But see Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Where Are We Now on Patent System
Improvements and How Can We Best Make Further Progress 1-2 (Dec. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Chief
Judge Michel Address], available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/FTCspeech.pdf (prepared address
of Chief Judge Paul R. Michel for delivery at the Federal Trade Commission Hearing on the
Evolving IP Marketplace) (contending that there a lack of empirical evidence to support the
proposition that so called "low quality patents" are a problem or that litigation is out of control).
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and more, according to the coalition, such litigation is being instigated by patent
aggregators derisively referred to as "patent trolls."16
On the opposite side of the reform push are the Coalition for 21st Century
Patent Reform and the Innovation Alliance.17 The former is comprised of a diverse
group of industries but populated in significant part by representatives from the
patent law associations and pharmaceutical and medical device industries.1 8 The
latter is a diverse group including a large mobile phone manufacturer and
technology-based companies. 19 Both groups argued that the reforms being urged by
20
the CPF would weaken patents and thereby harm innovation in this country.
Because of its unique position, the university community has been caught in the
middle of the debate. As noted above, the genesis of the patent reform movement, in
part, came out of the university community with the publication of articles by
scholars in the economic and social science disciplines criticizing the patent system
and reacting to an important study from the National Academy of Sciences. 21 At the
22
same time, universities have increasingly become users of the patent system.
Almost 4% of the patents issued annually by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO") are owned by universities or patent licensing entities
associated with universities, like the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
("WARF").23 University generated patents are licensed by existing companies or used
as platform technologies to start companies. 24 The revenues generated from them
are an important source of unrestricted funds for universities struggling to survive in
a time when State funding is declining. 25 More importantly, beyond financial
benefits, patenting and licensing is often the best or only way to ensure that the
results of taxpayer-funded research are used to improve lives. 26 So, while some

16 See, e.g., The Patent Reform Act of 2009: Hearing on S. 515 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary
111th
Cong.
(2009),
available
at
www.finnegan.com/files/upload/0903l0Appletontestimony.pdf (statement of Steven R. Appleton, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Micron Technology, Inc.).
17See, e.g., Patent Law Overhaul." Hearing on S. 515 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. (2009) (statements of Taraneh Maghame, Vice President, Tessera, Inc. & Philip S.
Johnson, Chief Intellectual Property counsel, Johnson & Johnson).

18Id. (statement of Philip S. Johnson, Chief Intellectual Property counsel, Johnson & Johnson).
19Id. (statement of Taraneh Maghame, Vice President, Tessera, Inc.).
20 Id. (statements of Taraneh Maghame, Vice President, Tessera, Inc. & Philip S. Johnson,
Chief Intellectual Property counsel, Johnson & Johnson).
21 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22 PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT GRANTS 1969-2005 (2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/

ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/doc/doc info 2005.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
23 Id. (citing U.S. academic institutions as representing 4.2% of non-governmental U.S.
organizations in 2005).
24 See Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and ProprietaryRights: PuttingPatents in Their
ProperPlace, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217, 219-220 (2006); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trol]s,
18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 614 (2008) (describing university patents

licensed to companies as building blocks for new technologies).
25 Lemley, supra note 24, at 619-20 (explaining one billion dollars in licensing revenue help
fund university research and education).
26 DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH, A PLAN TO ENSURE
TAXPAYERS' INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED 16 (2001), http://www.nih.gov/news/070101wyden.htm (last

visited Mar. 30, 2009); Paul J. Riley, Comment, Patenting Dr. Venter's Genetic Findings: Is the
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members of the university community have argued in favor of reform, others have
been apprehensive that the proposed reforms will adversely affect the ability of
27
universities to license inventions arising from their research for the public good.
This article will examine: (1)the history and benefits of patenting and licensing
the fruits of publicly-funded university research; 28 (2) the characteristics of U.S.
patent law that complement the university technology transfer environment; 29 (3) the
risks and benefits of current patent reform proposals on the effective transfer and
utilization of university intellectual property;3 0 and (4) a proposal for positive
31
change.

I. THE NATION HAS BENEFITED FROM THE PATENTING AND LICENSING OF
FEDERALLY FUNDED INVENTIONS

Following World War II, the United States government made a deliberate
decision to adopt a national science policy, under which the federal government
would be a primary source of funds for basic research at our public and private
universities. 32 This decision was a response to a 1945 report to President Franklin D.
33
Roosevelt written by Vannevar Bush entitled, Science: The Endless Frontier.
Coming on the heels of the war, Bush made the case that science was a proper
concern of government and funding basic research was necessary to protect national
34
security, enhance public health and welfare, and grow the economy.
In the subsequent 30 years, federal funding became a large proportion of the
basic University research budget. 35 However, it was not until the enactment of the
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980,36 together with its amendments in 198437 and augmentation
in 198638 (collectively "Bayh-Dole") that the government funding of research began to

NationalInstitutes ofHealth CreatingHurdles or Clearing the Path for Biotechnology's Voyage into
the Twenty-First Century?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 309, 321 (1994).
27See Bagley, supra note 24, at 224 (noting that patent rules often force researchers to choose
between academic discourse proprietary rights).
28 See infra Part I.
29 See infra Part II.
30 See infra Part III.
31 See infra Part IV.
'32 See 131 CONG. REC. 527 (1985) (statement of Hon. George E. Brown, Jr.); Richard C.
Atkinson, President, University of California, Lecture at The United Nations University Tokyo,
Japan: The Role of Research in the University of the Future 5 (Nov. 4, 1997), availablo at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=richard-atkinson
(last visited
Mar. 30, 2009).
33 Atkinson, supra note 32, at 5; VANNEVAR BUSH, OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT, SCIENCE THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 8 (1945), available
at http://www.nsf.gov/od/lpa/nsf50/vbush1945.htm.
34 BUSH, supra note 33.
3 See generally Atkinson, supra note 32, at 5 (crediting federal funding for placing
Universities at the center of research).
36 BayhDole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-29 (1980).
37 Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, sec. 501, 98 Stat. 3335, 3364-68

(1984).

38

See Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, sec. 9, 100 Stat. 1785, 1796

(1986) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)).
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fulfill the vision of Vannevar Bush. Bayh-Dole provided a right and an implied duty
to commercialize the fruits of federally funded research.39 It permitted universities
to take title to inventions arising from federally funded research, 40 used the patent
system to promote utilization of federally funded inventions, 41 encouraged
collaboration with industry, 42 required a preference toward licensing to small
business and U.S. manufacturers, 43 required sharing royalties received from such
licensing with inventors, 44 and provided the velvet hammer of "march-in rights" if the
45
technology was not so utilized.
Bayh-Dole has been an unqualified success. The Economist in 2002 referred to
Bayh-Dole as "[piossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in
America over the past half-century." 46 This is because prior to Bayh-Dole, title to
federally funded inventions rested with the federal government and incentives to
utilize the technology were limited or even non-existent. 47 Thus, Bayh-Dole unlocked
the technological, industrial and economic potential of America's national science
policy. 48 The Economist went on to say, "More than anything, this single policy
49
measure helped to reverse America's precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance."
At the time Bayh-Dole was adopted, only a handful of universities were involved
in patenting and licensing university inventions. 50 Today over 200 universities have
technology transfer offices. 51 This increase is a direct consequence of the passage of
Bayh-Dole, as the law requires recipients of federal research funding to have a
mechanism in place to carry out the requirements of the Act. 52 The most recent
licensing survey of the Association of University Technology Managers ("AUTM")
indicates that in 2007, its member institutions received almost $50 billion of federal
research funding, obtained over 3,600 patents, executed over 5,000 license or option
agreements, started over 550 small companies, and had over 680 new products

39 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12; JENNIFER A. HENDERSON & JOHN J. SMITH, ACADEMIA, INDUSTRY,
AND THE BAYH-DOLE ACT:
AN IMPLIED DUTY TO COMMERCIALIZE 1 (2002), available at
http://www.cimit.org/news/regulatory/coij) art3.p df.
40 35 U.S.C. § 202; HENDERSON & SMITH, suprn note 39, at 3.
4135 U.S.C. § 202,'HENDERSON & SMITH, supranote 39, at 3.
42 35 U.S.C. § 202; HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 39, at 3. More recently Congress has
passed the CREATE Act which further facilitates collaborations between industry and universities.
See Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108453, 118 Stat. 3596, 3596-97 (amending 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)).
43 35 U.S.C. § 202; HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 39, at 3.
4 35 U.S.C. § 202; HENDERSON & SMITH, supranote 39, at 3.
45 35 U.S.C. § 202; HENDERSON & SMITH, supranote 39, at 3.
46 Innovation's Golden Goose, ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, at 3.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 ITd
50 See HENDERSON & SMITH, supranote 39, at 2.

51 See About AUTM, http://www.betterworldproject.org/about.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009)
(stating that the Association of University Technology Managers has a membership of 3,600
licensing professionals representing more than 350 universities, research institutions, hospitals and
government agencies); see also Lita Nelson, The Rise of Intellectual Property Protection in The
American University, SCIENCE, March 6 1998, at 1460.
52 35 U.S.C. § 207; 37 C.F.R. § 404.5 (2009).
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introduced. 53 At least 27 universities earned more than $10 million in 2007 from
licensing the rights to vaccines, drugs, medical devices and other technology
innovations. 54 Finally, over 3,800 small companies based on university research
55
continue to operate, employing Americans and developing American technology.
Universities have long been generators for their local economies. But with the
increase in federal research funding and the ability to use the patent system to
transfer their inventions from the lab to the general public, American universities
have become centers of innovation. 56 Thomas L. Friedman, in his book The World is
Flat,quotes Bill Gates:
Our university system is the best .... [1it is a great engine of innovation in
the world, and with federal tax money, with some philanthropy on top of
that, [it will continue to flourish].... We will really have to screw things up
for our absolute wealth not to increase. If we are smart, we can increase it
57
faster by embracing this stuff.
But it is not simply the funding and the patent system that make American
universities innovation engines; it is also the combination of a culture of openness,
the availability of capital markets, the willingness of faculty entrepreneurs to take
58
risk, and the strength of patents in the United States.
Universities generally do not have the ability to commercialize technology on
their own.59 Moreover, the technology they produce is often at an early stage of
development. 60 This creates two realities: (a) Universities must rely on willing
commercial partners, be they small start-ups or large established corporations; 61 (b)
because of the early stage of the technology, the amount of capital needed to
commercialize technology is often very large, and the risk of failure is often very
62
high.
In the vast majority of cases, the only thing that can justify the extraordinary
expenditure of risk capital necessary to support university technology development is
63
the promise of market exclusivity through a strong and robust patent portfolio.
53 AsSOC. OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTMI U.S. LCENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY2O)7, at 11
(Robert Ticc elmanii et al. ed0s., 2(i08), aviible
at http://www.aitm.n t/Cont nt/Mavigation\Irni l/
Sure/i
g/
(
nsingActiVitySurVcy/AUTMSS 7FINAI.pdf.
54 See id. at 44-48.
5 Id. at 11.
56 See Innovation's Golden Goose, supranote 46.
57 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT:

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST

CENTURY 330-331 (Picador 2007) (2005).
5S Id.

, See, e.g., HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 39, at 5 (exemplifying the unavailability of
manufacturing to industry standards at universities).
6o See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 24, at 614 (describing universities as patenting the building
blocks of technology).
61 See, e.g., HENDERSON & SMITH, supra note 39, at 5 (citing large university licensing to new
companies and start-ups).
62 See, e.g., Richard J. Gilbert, Dollars For Genes: Revenue Generation by the California
Institute for Regenerative Medicine, 21 BERKELEY TECH, L.J. 1107, 1124-25 (2006) (describing the
millions of dollars necessary to develop, test, approve, and market a new drug).
6 See, e.g., id. at 1135-36 (explaining how exclusive licenses to a technology can encourage
investors to invest in the technology).
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Indeed, in the experience of the authors, investors rely in large part on the strength
of a start-up's patent portfolio to gauge whether it is worth taking the risk of
investing.6 4 These investors look to the promise of market exclusivity arising out of
the company's patents to determine whether they will have adequate time to make a
65
reasonable return.
Indeed, the importance of a supportive environment for start-up companies and
university technology grows each year. Companies in major industries are curtailing
66
their internal research programs, recognizing that discovery is costly and high-risk.
67
They have instead shifted this risk to universities and to small start-up companies.
This is a fundamental change, which signals that university innovation, and strong
patent protection to move it into the marketplace, are more important today than
68

ever before.

II. CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITED STATES PATENT LAW COMPLEMENT THE
UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ENVIRONMENT

There are three important characteristics of United States patent law that
complement the University technology transfer environment. The first is a bias in
favor of disclosure rather than trade secret. 69 The second is a unique system in
which the first person to invent is accorded patent rights along with a generous oneyear grace period for prior publication, use, or sale of the invention by the
inventors. 70 The third is a presumption of validity for issued patents and significant
remedies for infringement, which encourage technology users to license intellectual
71
property rather than infringe.

64 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 653 (2002) ("Among venture
capitalists, both the quantity and quality of patents have long been factors that are taken into
consideration when deciding whether to invest in a company, particularly in its early stages.").

(31See id.
(36See Jules Duga et al., Slowing Economy Dampens 2008 R&D Spending: The US. Research
and Development Environment is Being Shaped in 2008 by a Myriad of Economi, Political,and
Technical
Factors,
R&D
MAG.,
Feb.
2008,
at
F3,
F15,
available
at
http://www.rdmag.com/pdf/RD0802_FundForecast.pdf.
67 See Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the Commercialization of
Publically Funded Medical Research. Is There A Role for Compulsory Government Royalty Fees2
13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 132 (2007) (explaining that private firms "[t]ypically do not
undertake socially desirable projects due to high transaction costs and the risks and uncertainties
associated with them").
(38See Kristen Osenga, Closing in on Open Science: Trends in Intellectual Property &
Scientific Research; Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why Universities Should Take a Lesson
From Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 407, 410-11 (encouraging universities to
view and exploit their intellectual property assets); see also Out ofDusty Labs, ECONOMIST, March
3, 2007.

(39See infra Part II.A.
70 See infra Part II.B.
71 See infra Part II.C.
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A. Bias FavoringDisclosure
Universities are open environments.72 A principal goal of any university is to
disseminate knowledge, typically through publishing research. 73 Indeed, a successful
74
record of publication is generally a requirement for obtaining tenure and funding.
But there is a broader societal purpose in publication: to advance the research
enterprise. Disclosure allows others to learn from discoveries and build upon them,
75
thereby advancing the field-a virtuous cycle.

United States patent law is rooted in the U.S. Constitution at Article I, Section
8, clause 8 which grants Congress the power "[to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries ....76 Thomas Jefferson, to whom this
phrase is attributed, believed that the patent grant was necessary to induce
inventors to disclose their inventions to the public. 77 Only through disclosure could
78
the public learn from the inventor and improve on the invention.

72 See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 24 at 226 ("[P]rofessors are attracted to the chance to pursue
similar interests in an academic arena where they are also endowed with freedom to research topics
of their choice.").
73AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM
AND TENURE WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS 3 (10th ed. 2006) [hereinafter ACADEMIC
FREEDOM],
available
at
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/EBB 1B330-33D3-4A5 1 -B534CEEOC7A90DAB/0/1940StatementofPrinciplesonAcademicFreedomandTenure .pdf.
74See Bagley, supra note 24, at 226-227.
7,See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418-19 (2007) (stating most inventions
'[r]ely upon building blocks long since uncovered"); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac
McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in VI THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON:
BEING HIS
AUTOBIOGRAPHY, CORRESPONDENCE, REPORTS, MESSAGES, ADDRESSES AND OTHER WRITINGS,
OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE 175, 180 (H.A. Washington ed., 1854) [hereinafter Letter from Thomas

Jefferson], available at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/aI 8 8sl2.html (stating
that "[i]deas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual
instruction of man").
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
77 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1966); Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra
note 75, at 180-81.
78 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 75, at 180-81.
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual
may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself' but the moment it is
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot
dispossess himself of it.
Id. at 180. Some commentators suggest that patents are not necessary for innovation and to a
limited extent that is true. See, e.g., Samson Vermont, Taming the Doetrineof Equivalents in Light
of Patent Failure, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 83, 105 (2008) ("[P]atents outside chemistry and
pharmaceuticals actually discourage innovation and that most innovators would be better off with
no patent system than with the one we have."). Innovators will innovate whether a patent system
exists or not. See, e.g., id. The issue, however, is whether and how innovators will disclose their
innovations so that others may learn from them. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, supra note 75, at
181. In other words an innovator can keep the innovation as a trade secret and use it primarily for
private benefit. As a consequence, the public benefit will be more limited and innovation will be
compromised. This is because disclosure, which is rewarded by the present patent system, allows
the public to learn of and improve on innovation thus promoting the progress of the useful arts. Id.
at 180.
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Thus, the Constitution provides a "tit for tat" exchange.
U.S. patent law
requires full disclosure of how to make and use the invention,'9 including the best
mode for using it.80 In return for this disclosure, the government grants the right to
exclude others from making, using, selling and importing the invention during the
81
term of the patent, provided the other requirements of patentability are met.
Thus, the choice of disclosure through patenting over trade secret translates into
the ability to enforce one's patent rights against an infringer. 82 This is true even if
an infringer independently discovered the same invention and had been secretly
using it before the patent was issued. 83 In contrast, an inventor has no recourse
under trade secret law against another entity that independently develops the same
84
invention.
Overall, the bias in our Constitution against trade secrets aligns with the spirit
of the university environment. One cannot concurrently hold a patent and keep a
trade secret covering the same invention. 85 Universities, generally, do not harbor or
benefit from trade secrets. 86 With students coming and going, collaboration amongst
researchers with publication as an expectation, the university environment is not
87
conducive to confidentiality.
Outside of the United States, however, the bias is tipped in favor of trade
secrets.88 Almost all foreign jurisdictions permit "prior user rights" which allow the
continued use of a patented invention by one who had been using it as a trade secret
from before the date for which the patent was applied. 89 The continued use is
limited, not transferable and requires a royalty payment 90 , but it does dilute the

7 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 113 (2006) (requiring an inventor to provide detailed written descriptions
and illustrations to facilitate the understanding of the patented idea).

80 Id. §

112.

81Id.§ 154(a)(1).
82 See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret
Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 371, 376-77 (2002)
(explaining a choice must be made between trade secret or patent protection).
83 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (granting the right to exclude all others); Gillman v. Stern, 114
F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1940) ("Just as a secret use is not a 'public use,' so a secret inventor is not a 'first
inventor."'). But see 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (giving prior user rights for business method patents).
84 See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 82, at 383-84 (explaining that trade secret protection
ends with "independent development by a third party").
85 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring a patent specification to include a written description of
the invention to "[e]nable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same"), with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended
1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (requiring that a trade secret "is the subject of efforts that are
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.").
8 See generally ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 73, at 3 (maintaining publication and
freedom of publication as a principle in universities).
87 See id.
88 See, e.g., Lisa M. Brownlee, Trade Secret Use ofPatentable Inventions, Prior User Rights

and Patent Law Harmonization."An Analysis and Proposal,72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
523, 538 (1990) ("[U]nder certain countries' prior user rights statutes evidences that hidden, secret
prior use entitles the prior user to continued user rights.").
8)See, e.g., id. at 526 ("Virtually all countries with patent systems, with the exception of the
United States and the Philippines, have FTF systems.").
90 See Sean T. Carnathan, Patent PriorityDisputes-A Proposed Re-Definition of 'Tirst-toInvent,"49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 802 (1998).
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scope of exclusivity of the patent owner. 9 1 More importantly it rewards secrecy,
'92
which ultimately delays advancement of the "useful arts.
Given our country's long held bias in favor of disclosure, and the extraordinary
technological innovation in this country over its history, it is no surprise that efforts
to incorporate prior user rights into U.S. patent law have failed, except to a limited
93
extent applied to business method patents.
Ultimately, the bias against trade secrets encourages collaboration, particularly
between universities and the private sector. 94 Congress has recognized that such
collaboration furthers the goals of United States patent law. 95 To that end, Congress
passed the CREATE Act of 2004.96 One of the principal benefits of the CREATE Act
is that it eliminates the threat that secret prior art of individual collaborators can be
used to invalidate the patented inventions coming out of a pre -established, written,
joint research agreement. 97 Consequently, both patent law's bias against trade secret
and the CREATE Act encourage collaborators to be more open with one another,
98
thereby increasing the likelihood that the joint research will bear fruit.

B. Firstto Invent and the GracePeriod
Two provisions that are unique to United States patent law are very important
to the open environment of the university. The first is that the United States awards
patent rights to the first person to invent, rather than the first person to file a patent
application. 99 The second is the provision of a grace period, whereby an inventor is
not barred from obtaining a patent even if he or she has made the invention available
to the public through publication, use, or sale during the year prior to filing.100

91 See, e.g., Brownlee, supra note 88, at 534 (stating that prior user rights "[p]rovide a right for
the first inventor to continue use concurrently with the patentee.").
92 See id. ("With no public awareness of the invention, there is no contribution to the art on

which to build further invention.").
9 See e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007) (terminating in the Senate).
But see 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(1) (2006) (giving prior user rights for business method patents).
94 See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (promoting collaboration between universities and commercial entities
by using the patent system).
95150 CONG. REC. S 11,775 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2004); see Cooperative Research and Technology
Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-453, 118 Stat. 3596, 3596-97.
9,See CONG. REC. S11,775 ("The CREATE Act corrects a provision in the Bayh-Dole Act which,
when read literally, runs counter to the intent of that legislation."); CREATE Act sec. 2 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)).
97150 CONG. REC. S11,775 ("[E]nsuring that non-public information is not considered 'prior art'
when the information is used in a collaborative partnership under the Bayh-Dole Act."); CREATE
Act sec. 2 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 103(c)) (deeming ownership of prior art to all parties
in an effective joint research agreement).
98 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (requiring disclosure of the invention in order to receive patient rights);
Id. § 103(c) (permitting collaboration on research).
99Id. § 102(a).
100 Id. § 102(b).
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The first-to-invent and grace period provisions compliment the university
culture of publishing swiftly and frequently. 1 1 While publication may bar an
inventor from obtaining patent rights under a foreign first-to-file system, in many
cases the same inventor can still secure a U.S. patent. 10 2 Because the U.S. is an
enormous market, there remains considerable value in choosing to publish quickly,
then obtain a U.S. patent, rather than guard one's discovery in order to secure a
03
foreign patent.
These provisions also facilitate a university's ability to operate effectively on
0 4
limited resources. University inventions are usually very early-stage technologies.
The grace period allows the inventor to better understand the invention and the
university to make an informed decision about whether it is worth expending
resources to file a patent application. 105 Because university technology transfer
offices often have limited support and personnel, the grace period provides much
needed time to adequately weigh the costs and benefits of filing.106
Most importantly, the first-to-invent system prevents a race to the patent
office. 10 7 Unlike foreign first-to-file systems, inventors are not pushed to file hastily
in order to obtain United States patent rights. 08
This is important because
Universities are frequently on the leading edge of complicated technologies, which
may require significant time to evaluate. 109 Yet universities often operate with slow
or limited resources as explained above. 110 Thus, valuable patent opportunities could
be lost if inventors and universities did not act quickly enough, or alternatively,
resources could be wasted on unnecessary or unproductive filings.111

C. SignificantInfringement Remedies and the Presumptionof Validity Benefit
Universities by EncouragingLicensingand Innovation
U.S. patent law provides a strong incentive to obtain a license and avoid
infringement. 112 Infringement can be a costly activity.113 Damages are often
uncertain in amount, and can be increased if the infringement is found to be
willful.1 1 4 Infringers also face the prospect of injunction against the infringing
101See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, The Need for Speed (andGrace).*Issues In a First-Inventor-ToFile World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1035, 1058 (2008) ("[A] one-year grace period is beneficial and
important for small entity inventors, including academic researchers.").
102 See id.at 1056, 1058; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
103 See Bagley, supra note 101, at 1051-56.
104 Lemley, supra note 24, at 614.
105 See Bagley, supra note 101, at 1051.
106 See id. at 1046.

107 F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economies of Present
Patent-ObtainingRules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 96-97 (2003).
108See Kieff, supranote 107, at 96-98.
109See Bagley, supra note 101, at 1046.
110Id.
M Id.at 1047.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 273, 284-85 (2006) (stating the grounds for infringement, the availability
of treble damages upon a finding of infringement, and the award of attorneys fees for "exceptional
cases").
112

113
114

See id. § 284.
See id.

[8:328 2009]

Patent Reform Should Not Leave Innovation Behind

manufacture, use, sale or importation of the invention. 115 Moreover, the presumption
of patent validity under U.S. law increases the challenge of defending against a
charge of infringement. 116 Thus, it is often much more cost-effective and certain to
prospectively obtain a license.
This incentive to license is particularly important for a university technology
transfer office. 117 While universities obtain many patents, they do not themselves
typically make products.118 Instead they depend on the ability to license patents to
established or start-up companies to commercialize their inventions. 119 If patents are
weak and the damages for infringing are low, or at least no greater than the cost of
1 20
licensing, it becomes much less attractive for a company to take a license.
Strong patents and a high cost for infringing also stimulate innovation. If the
cost of infringement is high, and a license isnot available or that cost isalso too high,
the alternative is to design-around the patent. 121 Designing around is both legal and
desirable to further innovation.1 22 The design-around may result not just in an
incremental improvement, but in the creation of disruptive innovative technology
that leapfrogs pre-existing technology.123

115See 35 U.S.C. §§ 273, 283 (stating the grounds for infringement, and allowing injunctive
relief for patent infringement "inaccordance with the principles of equity").
116See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (presuming the validity of patents); Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear
Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (placing the burden on a challenger to disprove the
validity of a patent with clear and convincing evidence).
117 See Assoc. OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 53, at 34 (stating that licensing is the
primary responsibility of technology transfer offices and "[i]s the process that provides the
institution the guarantee that a given technology will be used to further the public good and,
perhaps, generate revenue for the institution.").
118See Diana Marrero, Drug-Makers, High-Tech Companies Clash Over Patents: Debate on
Reform Plan Before Congress has Big Implications For State Investors, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
May 27, 2008, at Al (citing statistics of the numbers of patents granted to and licensing agreements
entered into by WARF).
119 See generally OFFICE OF TECH. COMMERCIALIZATION, PURDUE RESEARCH FOUND., 2007
ANNUAL REPORT 18-19 (2007), available at http://www.prf.org/pdf/2007%o2OAnnualo2oReport.pdf
(exemplifying start-up and licensing statistics).
120 See Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535, 538 (2008) ("For weak patents, [the odds
the patent will be found valid and infringed] is so low that, pending patent litigation, [a downstream
monopolist] would without a license make more expected profits by selling the product without
redesigning it, because the odds are sufficiently low that the patent holder will win .. ").
121 See Dana W. Hayter, When a License is Worse Than a Refusal."A Comparative Competitive
Effects Standard to Judge Restrictions in Intellectual Property Licenses, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
281, 284 (1996) (noting that a patent holder's refusal to license create more incentive in others to
invent around the invention).
122 Westvaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Designing or
inventing around patents to make new inventions is encouraged." (quoting London v. Carson Pirie
Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).
123 See id. ("D]esigning new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is the stuff
of which competition is made and is supposed to benefit the consumer." (quoting State Indus., Inc. v.
A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985))).
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RISKS AND BENEFITS TO UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER UNDER THE
PROPOSED PATENT REFORM

As stated above, the present patent system fosters the university technology
transfer environment in three ways: 1)it promotes disclosure and is biased against
trade secret; 124 2) it is a first-to-invent, rather than a first-to-file system that provides
a one year grace period to the inventor; 125 and 3) it provides significant infringement
remedies and a presumption of validity for issued U.S. patents. 126 The most recent
patent reform proposals would retain the bias against trade secret by continuing to
exclude prior user rights; however, they would create significant uncertainty for
universities by converting the United States to a first-to-file system and diminishing
infringement remedies.
The remainder of this paper will analyze selected provisions of the 111th
Congress patent reform proposals, and discuss their potential impact on university
interests. As mentioned above, the Patent Reform Act of 2007 ("H.R. 1908") passed
in the House of Representatives1 27, but stalled in the Senate ("S. 1145").128 The
Patent Reform Act of 2008129 ("S. 3600") was introduced in September 2008 and
referred to Committee during the 110th Congressional Session, but never passed into
law. 130 The 111th Congressional Session House and Senate Patent Reform Acts of
2009, are very similar to each other and to the Patent Reform Act of 2007 passed by
the House. 13 1 The Patent Reform Act of 2007, which was passed by the House,
created a tremendous amount of commentary from representatives of a variety of
industries including universities. 132 A number of provisions in S. 3600 were included
See supraPart II.A.
See supraPart II.B.
126 See supraPart II C.
127 153 CONG. REC. D1,173 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007).
128 See S. 1145 (as placed on Senate Legislative Calendar No. 563, January 24, 2008).
129 Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008).
130 See Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008) (as introduced in the Senate on
September 25, 2008 without any further action).
131 Comparc Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing amendments
to Title 35 of the United States Code) and Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009)
(same), with Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007) (same).
132 Seo Letter from the Presidents of the Big Ten Universities to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S.
Judiciary Comm. & Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, S. Judiciary Comm. (June 21, 2007)
[hereinafter Big Ten Letter] (on file with author) (urging "[c]areful and thoughtful approach to the
committee's consideration of patent reform legislations."); Letter from Charles E. Phelps, Provost,
Univ. of Rochester. to John Conyers, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary (June 18, 2007)
[hereinafter Rochester Letter] (on file with author) (expressing University of Rochester's concerns
with the H.R. 1908 that "[m]ay significantly undermine the commercialization of university
research."); Letter from F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Member of Cong., to John Conyers, Chairman,
House Comm. on the Judiciary (June 5, 2007) (on file with author) (expressing the view that all
relevant issues concerning H.R. 1908 have not been considered); Letter from Michael R. Orme,
General Counsel, Brigham Young Univ., to Orrin G. Hatch, United States Senator, at 2 (May 1,
2007) [hereinafter BYU Letter] (on file with author) (identifying and inviting consideration of '[a]
few proposals in the Patent Reform Act of 2007, which, if passed, appear to create new challenges
and disadvantages for universities and other patent holders similarly situated."); Letter from Fred
H. Reinhart, Assoc. Vice President for Research, Wayne State Univ., to John Conyers Jr., United
States Representative (Apr. 25, 2007) [hereinafter WSU Letter] (on file with author) (addressing
Wayne State University's concerns about the proposed modifications to U.S. patent law); Sarah M.
121

125
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to address the concerns expressed over the 2007 bill and it is expected that a Senate
bill substantially similar to the 2007 bill will be introduced in the 111th
Congressional Session to address the Senate Patent Reform Act bill of 2009.133 Table
1 contains a point-by-point comparison of selected provisions in H.R. 1145, and S.
3600.134

A. The Costs and Benefits of a First-to-FileSystem Are Uncertainfor Universities
One of the main goals of the 110th Congress patent reform proposals has been to
convert to a first-to-file system in order to abolish the United States' status as the
only country practicing a first-to-invent system. 135 Several university organizations
supported switching to the first-to-file system. 13 6 However, this support was
conditioned on the inclusion of three provisions: an effective grace period for filing
that allows scientists to maintain their culture of collegial discussion and preserve
the peer review process, a strong inventor's oath or declaration requirement, a
13 7
continuation of provisional applications and elimination of prior user rights.
Though S. 3600 (as introduced by Senator Kyl) incorporates these provisions, it
still presents potential problems for universities. To begin, the Bill would abolish
interference proceedings, which are currently used to determine priority of
inventorship. 138 Instead, the USPTO would conduct "derivation" proceedings to
determine if an applicant derived an invention from the petitioner. 13 9 Challengers
would have only one year from the date the application is published in which to
petition for the derivation proceeding. 140 Given that universities often do not have
sufficient staff or budget to monitor third-party filings, this one-year window could
create a substantial hardship.14 1 Also, if universities do not file first or petition for a
King, Clearing the Patent Thicket: The Supreme Court and Congress Undertake Patent Reform,
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., September 2007, at 13, 16 (noting divisive opinions regarding the
Patent Reform Act of 2007 based on industry).
133 Matthew M. Peters, Legislative Update, The Equitable Inequitable: Adding Proportionality
and Predictabilityto Inequitable Conduct in the Patent Reform Act of 2008, 19 DEPAUL J. ART.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 77, 78 (2008).
1'3 See infra TABLE I.
135 See H.R. 1908 § 3 (establishing and defining the right of the first inventor to file); S. 3600
§ 2 (same).
136 See, e.g., ASSOC. OF AMERICAN UNIVS. ET AL., COMMENTS ON H.R. 1908 AND S. 1145, THE
PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2007, at 1-2 (2007), available athttp://www.patentsmatter.com/media/issue/
resources/20070501 UnivColl.pdf (stating that the Association of American Universities, American
Council on Education, National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges,
Association of American Medical Colleges, and Council on Governmental Relations '[d]o not oppose
the U.S. patent system moving from a first-to-invent to a first-inventor-to-file system.").
137 See id.
138 Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 2 (h)-(j) (2008) (replacing interference
proceedings with derivation proceedings); see 35 U.S.C. § 135 (2006) (authorizing interference
proceedings).
13) S. 3600 § 2(i).
140 Id. (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)(1)).
141 Cf ASSOC. OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra note 53 at 17-8 (stating that U.S. University
technology transfer programs depend on the staff and resources available to the program and
indicates that most offices have between seven to fourteen staff members); Bagley, supra note 101 at
1046 (stating that Technology Transfer Offices have limited funds).
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derivation proceeding, experimental university research could be stifled by assertions
of infringement given the very limited protection provided by the experimental use
142
defense after the Federal Circuit's decision in Madey v. Duke.
The proposed patent reforms do favor early disclosure, however, by exempting
prior art that arises during a one-year grace period after the applicant publishes the
invention regardless of whether the prior art was derived from the applicant. 143 To
that extent, the bills compliment the university technology transfer environment and
144
furthers the Constitutional purpose of U.S. patent law.

B. The ProposedReforms Diminish Infringement Remedies and PatentStrength
1. Apportionment ofDamages
The two principal patent reform bills from the 111th Congress contained
sections aimed to curb damage awards in infringement cases.145
University
organizations generally agreed that the bills introduced an inflexible methodology for
the calculation of damages.14 6 They feared that inappropriately low damage awards
would result, thus reducing the deterrent effect that comes from a judgment of
infringement. 147 Some even contended that the bills would make a finding of
infringement no more costly than negotiating a license ex ante, or worse, that it
would equate to the grant of a compulsory license.14 8 Universities feared that the
provision would reduce the incentive to license and invest effort and resources in
commercializing
university-developed
inventions.14 9
Instead,
universities
maintained that courts should continue to have discretion in determining which
economic principles should apply to damages calculations based on the facts of each
case.150

142

See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (concluding that the

experimental use defense is very narrow); see also ASSOC. OF AMERICAN UNIVS. ET AL., supra note
136, at 5 ("We believe that the Committee should give careful consideration.., to inclusion of an
experimental research exemption in any patent reform legislation that is enacted.").
"3 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (proposing amendment to 35
U.S.C. § 102); S. 3600 at § 2 (same).
144 Compare S. 515 § 2 (eliminating a statutory bar due to publication under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)
and granting a one year grace period), and S. 3600 at § 2 (same), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8
(granting a limited monopoly for disclosure "[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts."),
andACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra note 73, at 3 (maintaining publication and freedom of publication in
the university setting).
145 Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009) (proposing amendment to 35
U.S.C. § 284); S. 515 § 4 (same).
16 See ASSOC. OF AMERICAN UNIVS. ET AL., UNIVERSITY VIEWS ON S. 1145, THE PATENT
REFORM ACT OF 2007, at 1-2 (2008) [hereinafter UNIVERSITY VIEWS], available at
www.aau.edu/WorkArea/showcontent.aspx?id=2538 (discussing opposition to apportionment of
damages in the Patent Reform Act of 2007 that is similar to the same section of the Patent Reform
Act of 2009).
147 Id.
148

See, e.g., WSU Letter, supranote 132, at 2.

149

See, e.g., id.

150 See Big Ten Letter, supra note 132, at 1; ASsoc. OF AMERICAN UNIVS. ET AL., supra note

136, at 4.
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The damages provisions of S. 3600, the Patent Reform Act of 2008, introduced in
the waning days of the 110th Congress by the Honorable Jon Kyl are an
improvement but still contain rigid and unfavorable limitations. For example, there
are severe limits on when a finder of fact can consider "a standard or average ratio or
division of profits, an industry average rate for royalties, or other method that are
not based on the particular benefits or advantages of the use of the invention" or a
"comparison to royalties paid for patents other than the patent in suit." 151
Marketplace negotiations for patent licenses normally rely on industry standards and
exemplary transactions. 152 The parties consider this information, and then make
adjustments up or down based on the unique features of the deal. 153 This includes
not just the nature of the patents at issue, but also the nature of the licensee, the
industry, and the product or service. 154 Under the criteria set out in the S. 3600, it
would be difficult for patentees to present evidence of industry standards and
comparable deals. For example, one of the triggers to apply a standardized measure
is that "the use of the invention is the primary reason for the infringing product or
process." 155 This is rarely the case for universities, which perform basic research that
is often used to enable the creation of a product. 156 As another example, to rely on a
rate from a "comparable patent[]," S. 3600 requires that the patent is "found to be
economically comparable to the patent in suit."157 There will likely be arguments
over what patents are "economically comparable" and, even if two patents are not of
comparable value, knowing the market price for the first can help a finder of fact
determine the market price for the second. 158 For example, if the industry charges a
royalty rate of 10% for a patent of only limited value, this information is powerful
evidence that the price of a much more important patent in the industry should be
greater than 10%.159 The applicability of such data seems to be prohibited under S.
3600.160 The complex set of criteria for applying industry standards and comparable
rates, even if they do not bar outright the use of these metrics, will likely proliferate
the number of challenges to a reasonable royalty analysis and potentially increase
appeals regarding damages.
S. 3600 also implements a procedural change unfavorable to patent holders:
either party to litigation can force bifurcation of the liability and damages phases of
the trial. 161 Bifurcation usually increases the costs of litigation by extending the
151 Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 4 (2008) (proposing amendment to 35
U.S.C. § 284(d) and (e)).
152 See, e.g., Ted Hagelin, Valuation of Patent Licenses, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 423, 424

(2004).
153
154

See, e.g., id. at 424-25.
See, e.g., id.

155 S. 3600 § 4 (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 284(d)(1)).
156 See, e.g., Marrero, supra note 118 at Al (citing statistics of the numbers of patents granted
to and licensing agreements entered into by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation).
157 S. 3600 § 4(e) (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 284(e)(1)).
158 See Hagelin, supranote 152, at 424-25.
159

See id.

160 See S. 3600 § 4(d)-(e) (stating that '[a] reasonable royalty shall not be determined by the
use of an average ratio for the division of profits, an industry average rate for royalties" or "[b]y
comparison to royalties paid for patents other than the patent ins suit" unless the party asserting
the claim demonstrates certain requirements).
161 See id. at § 4(g) (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 284(g)).
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length of trials. 162 Because Universities are often resource-limited, increasing the
163
complexity and length of litigation does not favor the university community.

2. Post-GrantReview
Another feature of the 110th Congress patent reform bills is the increased
opportunity for post-grant review of issued patents. 164 Proponents of post-grant
review generally argue that such review, in the form of an administrative procedure
at the USPTO, would be a cheaper alternative to litigation.1 65 University groups
generally supported a revised post-grant review procedure in the H.R. 1908 and
S. 1145 for this reason.1 66 More specifically, universities supported the "firstwindow" provision therein, which allowed a challenge to patents within the first 12
months of issuance through an administrative procedure.1 67 However, universities
had serious concerns about the open-ended "second window," which permitted a
broad range of challenges to patents over their lifetimes. 168 Specifically, some
university groups contended that this second window introduced a high degree of
uncertainty into patent licensing by precluding any element of finality in the
patenting process, thereby negatively affecting the presumption of validity.1 69 In
addition, the second window created yet another venue in which Universities would
be forced to defend themselves against larger corporate entities looking for strategic
leverage once involved in district court patent litigation. 170 The groups recommended
that at a minimum, Congress should limit the second window to consideration of
162

See, e.g., Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 387, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

(discussing the debate between plaintiffs and defendants over bifurcating patent trials).
103 See BYU Letter, supra note 132, at 4 (indicating that universities have limited resources
are "[m]ore likely to fold in the face of suffocating legal fees."); see also Rochester Letter, supra note
132, at 2 ("Educational institutions such as ours have limited budgets with which to protect our
intellectual property ....").
161 S. 3600 § 5; Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007).
165 Robert Fieseler, PatentReform Act: Cut Post-GrantReview, NAT'L L.J, Feb. 9, 2009, at 23.
166Soo UNIVERSITY VIEWS, supra note 146, at 3 (supporting only the post grant review "first
window"); see also Letter from Nathaniel F. Wienecke, Assistant Sec'y for Legislative and
Intergovernmental Affairs for U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, at 4 (Feb. 4, 2008) (supporting establishment of post-grant patent review
procedures) [hereinafter DoC Letter]; WSU Letter, supra note 132, at 2 (opposing "second window"
post grant review, but stating "Wayne State University, like many universities, sees few benefits for
itself in allowing oppositions to patents, but believes improved patent quality and certainty and time
and cost savings resulting from a reduction in the number of patent challenges after issuance are
valuable to the system and could adjust").
107 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY VIEWS, supra note 146, at 3.
168 See id. at 3; see also Big Ten Letter, supra note 132, at 1 ("Legislation should not allow any
'second window' for reconsideration of patents."); Rochester Letter, supra note 132, at 2 ("[A]llowing
an indefinite 'second window' for administrative oppositions creates an incentive for the infringer to
repeatedly challenge the patent they are infringing."); WSU Letter, supra note 132, at 2 ("We are,
however, adamantly opposed to any 'second window' right.").
169See BYU Letter, supra note 132, at 3 (stating that the "second window" will "[m]ake patents
less certain and more difficult to rely upon after issuance."); WSU Letter, supra note 132, at 3
("[S]econd window opportunity is a disincentive to innovate and introduces a high degree of
uncertainty into patent licensing .. ").
170 See e.g., BYU Letter, supra note 132, at 4.
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published prior art, insert an estoppel effect to prevent serial challenges, and include
a presumption of validity for all issued patents."'1 Multiple windows, coupled with
an ongoing potential for litigation, poses a potentially costly and lengthy process for
172
universities whose main goal is to simply license their technology.
S. 3600 retains a first window during which the USPTO can consider all
requirements of patentability. This provision includes a presumption of patent
validity and seems to be an improvement over H.R. 1908 and S. 1145.173 There are,
however, still areas of concern in the design of the first window. The USPTO can
consider questions of enablement and written description in the first window, but
broadening amendments are prohibited. 7 4 Unlike prior art rejections, a patentee
may not be able to overcome these 35 U.S.C. § 112 validity rejections by simply
narrowing the claims." 5 For example, in certain instances a written description
rejection can only be overcome by removing a limitation, potentially rendering the
claim broader. 7 6 Constraining the types of amendments available in the post-grant
review may inhibit a patentee's ability to protect the full scope of its invention. In
contrast, in a reissue application a patentee can broaden claims as long as the
77
proceeding commences within 2 years of the issuance of the patent.
The design of the second window in the S. 3600 is more favorable to patentees
than that of H.R. 1908 and S. 1145.178 Unlike the open-ended second window in H.R.
1908 and S. 1145, S. 3600 limits second window challenges to novelty and
obviousness in light of published prior art and sets a deadline for initiation of second
window challenges. 7 9
However, questions remain about whether multiple
opportunities for review plus the potential for litigation ultimately benefits infringers
more than patent holders, particularly those infringers for whom increased time and
80
expense are not deterrents.

171 See Assoc. OF AMERICAN UNIVS. ET AL., supra note 136, at 3 (recommending estoppel);
UNIVERSITY VIEWS, supra note 146, at 3 (recommending limiting the scope of the "second window"
to prior art); Rochester Letter, supra note 132, at 2 (recommending the presumption of validity be
upheld for patents under review).

172 Soo, e.g., UNIVERSITY VIEWS, supra note 146, at 2-3.
17' Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. §§ 321(a), 321(b)(1), 331(a) (2008); see also
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (regarding presumption of validity and defenses).
174 See S. 3600 § 5 (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. 332(c)).
175 See id. (prohibiting the enlargement of the scope of claims).
176 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2163.05 (6th rev. 2007) [hereinafter MPEP]; In -r Peters, 723 F.2d 891,
893-94 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (reversing the USPTO Board of Appeals' rejection of claims in a reissue
application that were broadened by removing an unnecessary limitation because this did not violate
the written description requirement).
177 See 35 U.S.C. § 251 (regarding reissue of defective patents); Peters, 723 F.2d at 893-94;
MPEP, supra note 176, § 2163.05.
178 Compare S. 3600 § 5 (proposing amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 322 (a), (c)), with Patent Reform
Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007) (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 322), and Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H. 1908, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007) (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 322).
179 S. 3600 § 4 (proposing amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 322 (a), (c)).
180 See JOHN R. THOMAS & WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PATENT REFORM IN
THE 110TH CONGRESS: INNOVATION ISSUES 11, 29 (2007) ("[C]oncerns have arisen over oppositions
because they too may be costly, complex, and prone to abuse as a means for harassing patent
owners.").
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The post grant review proposals do contain estoppel provisions, which could
limit subsequent claims against previously raised issues. The estoppel provisions in
all three bills apply to the first and second windows of post-grant review. 181 The S.
3600 estoppel provision is broader, however, in that it applies to petitioners, real
parties in interest, and their privies, while the provisions in H.R. 1908 and S. 1145
applied only to petitioners. 182 In addition, the S. 3600 provision prevents subsequent
challenges based on any issue that the petitioner actually raised in the first or second
window, or could have raised in the second window, 183 whereas H.R. 1908 and
S. 1145 barred only issues that were actually raised in either window.18 4 Still, the
S. 3600's estoppel provisions are more lenient than the current standard for inter
partesreexamination proceedings.18 5 First window estoppel in S. 3600 applies only
to issues that were actually raised, while interpartes reexamination estoppel applies
to issues that were or could have been raised at any point in the reexamination
proceeding. 186 Given that universities are likely to be patent holders rather than
infringers, it is questionable whether post grant review offers them any significant
187
benefit over the present system.
Another serious problem with the proposed post-grant review in all three bills is
that it increases the workload of an already overworked USPTO.1 88 One of the
purported reasons for patent reform was to increase patent quality. 189 That is also
the stated reason for the enhanced post-grant review provisions. 190 Reduced patent
quality, however, is symptomatic of an overworked USPTO.1 91 Even stronger
evidence of the USPTO's problems is the serious backlog of patent applications which
continues to grow in spite of the Office's attempts to add staff. 192 This suggests that
rather than enhance patent quality, the post-grant review provisions may simply
93
exacerbate the difficulties faced by the USPTO in addressing a growing backlog.1

181 S. 3600 § 5 (proposing amendment to
35 U.S.C.
amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 334); H.R. 1908 § 6 (same).
182

S. 3600 § 5 (proposing amendment to

§ 322(d));

S.

35 U.S.C. § 322(d)); S.

1145

§6

(proposing

1145 § 6 (proposing

amendments to 35 U.S.C. § 334); H.R. 1908 § 6 (same).
183 S. 3600 § 5 (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 322(d)).
181 S. 1145 § 6 (proposing amendments to 35 U.S.C. §§ 334); H.R. 1908 § 6 (same).
185 Compare S.
3600 § 5 (proposing amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 322(d)),

with 37
C.F.R. § 1.907(b)-(c) (prohibiting subsequent inter pa±rtesreexamination once a final decision has
been entered), and MPEP, supra note 176, § 2601 (discussing statutory estoppel upon subsequent
review of an interpartesreexamination).
186 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.907(b)-(c); MPEP, supra note 176 § 2601.
187 See, e.g, UNIVERSITY VIEWS, supra note 146, at 3 (noting their concern with the post grant
second window).
188 See S. 3600 (proposing amendments such that the USPTO will conduct post-grant review);
S. 1145 (same); H.R. 1908 (same); Chris J. Katopis, Perfect Happiness?."Game Theory as a Too] for
EnhancingPatent Quality, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 360, 367 (2007) (discussing the PTO's "enormous
workload").
189 155 CONG. REC. S2,706 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
190 See id.
191 See id. at S2,707.
192 Katopis, supranote 188, at 367.
193 See Chief Judge Michel Address, supra note 15, at 2-4. (discussing that deferred
examination by the USPTO which [ils already overwhelmed by ex parte examinations with average
pendencies of over three years" as a means of "[w]eeding out bad patents is unconvincing.").
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Post-grant review increases the opportunity for multiple challenges to the
validity of a patent in addition to litigation.194 This decreases the strength of U.S.
Patents, which may have the effect of deterring the contribution of risk capital to
195
start-up companies whose sole or primary asset is intellectual property.

IV.

PROPOSAL FOR POSITIVE CHANGE

As mentioned earlier, support for individual issues included in the Patent
Reform Acts largely reflect the concerns of specific industries, which are affected
differently by different aspects of U.S. patent laws. 196 Additionally, many of the
purported reasons for such reform are not supported by actual data and the
"remedies" presented may ultimately benefit only a few contingents at the expense
patent holders generally. 197 For example, claims that too many "low quality patents"
issue in the United States rarely are accompanied by any objective parameters about
what constitutes a low quality patent, or metrics demonstrating an increase in the
issuance of low quality patents. 198 Patent reform's solution to the perception of low
quality patents is additional opportunity for post-grant review, which may ultimately
decrease the initial value of all issued patents. 99 Thus, this "solution" to a problem
that is not well defined seems ill targeted, overly broad and detrimental to the value
that strong patents create for universities and their licensees.
Other issues cited in support of patent reform are the increasing costs of
enforcement, escalating and unreasonable damage awards and lack of
harmonization. 200 Increasing costs of enforcement are a concern to universities but
there is little in the proposed reform that appears to address this. In fact the reform
would add numerous proceedings to challenge a patent and the various proceedings
cumulatively could in fact significantly increase the cost of patent ownership and
enforcement. As far as the argument that reform is needed in order to harmonize the
patent law, there is little in the reform patent that leads to harmonization. Even the
first inventor to file has a derivation proceeding that would be unique to U.S. law and
20 1
hardly accomplishes harmonization.
In the last few years several decisions from Federal Courts have worked
fundamental changes in the patent system that have, to a good extent, also
M9

SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 10, at 7-8.

195 See James C. Greenwood, The US. Patent System Works: Bad Reform Would Stile
Innovation, EspeciallyRegardingBiotechnology PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 16, 2007, at B- 7

(noting the importance of strong patent protections to small businesses).
196See discussion supraINTRODUCTION.
197 SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 10, at 4-5; see also Chief Judge Michel Address, supra note
15, at 1-2 (pronouncing lack of evidence to support so called "low quality patents").
198 Chief Judge Michel Address, supranote 15, at 1-2.
199 SHAPIRO & MATHUR, supra note 10, at 5, 14.
200 See Kevin R. Davidson, Retooling Patents.* Current Problems, Proposed Solutions, and
Economic Implications for Patent Reform, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 425, 442-43, 448-49 (2008)
(citing low quality patents, litigation costs, and high damages as reasons for reform); Bagley, supra
note 101, at 1037-47 (discussing patent reform and global patent harmonization); Raymond J.
Keating, PatentReform and Entrepreneurs,WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A16 (citing low patent
quality, litigation costs, and global inconsistency as reasons necessitating patent law reform).
201 Bagley, supra note 101, at 1040.
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addressed many of the issues of which advocates of patent reform were complaining.
The following precedential court decisions will have effects on the examination
process within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, which will become more
evident in time.
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L. C.,20 2 the Supreme Court of the United States
confirmed that the traditional four-factor test for awarding permanent injunctive
relief applies to patent disputes. 203 The Court rejected the Federal Circuit's general
rule "that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have
been adjudged" and that an injunction "should be denied only in the 'unusual' case,
under 'exceptional circumstances' and 'in rare instances ... to protect the public
interest."' 20 4 This ruling has made it more difficult to obtain injunctions against
20 5
infringers, and to stop infringers from making or selling unlicensed products.
In In re Seagate Technology, LLC,206 the Federal Circuit established a new
standard for willful patent infringement. 20 7 The court overruled its previous
standard, which required merely a failure to exercise "due care" to avoid
infringement, and instead implemented a requirement of clear and convincing
evidence of "objective recklessness." 208 Only upon this showing does an infringer's
subjective beliefs become relevant. 20 9
This ruling has decreased findings of
2
willfulness in district courts. 10
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,211 the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit's strict teaching-suggestion-motivation ("TSM") test for obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103.212 The Federal Circuit's test required a suggestion to combine
references in the actual references themselves. 213 Instead, the Supreme Court
instructed courts to apply a more flexible TSM test based on the inquiry set forth in
Graham v. John Deere, Co. 214 The ruling inspired the USPTO to introduce strict new
rules for obviousness, making it more difficult to obtain patents. 215 It has also
216
increased findings of obviousness in district court proceedings.

202

547 U.S. 388 (2006).

203

Id. at 394.
Id.at 393-94.

204

Id.at 394 (requiring application of four-factor test in lieu of guaranteed injunction).
206 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub nom. Convolve, Inc. v. Seagate Tech., LLC,
128 S. Ct. 1445.
207 Id.at 1371.
205

208 Id.
209

Id.

Carl G. Anderson et al., Willful Patent Infringement: The First Year of the Post-Seagate
Era, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., September 2008, at 11, 13.
210

211

550 U.S. 398 (2007).

Id.at 419.
213 Id. at 407, 418.
212
214

Id.at 419 (citing Graham v. John Deere, Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).

215

See PATENT

AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXAMINATION GUIDELINES FOR

DETERMINING OBVIOUSNESS UNDER 35 U.S.C. 103 IN VIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN

INTERNATIONAL Co. v. TELEFLEX INC., 72 Fed. Reg. 57526-35 (Oct. 10, 2007); MPEP, supra
note 176, § 2141 (8th ed., 7th rev. 2008).
210 Nicholas G. Papastavros & Maria H. Harris, Do Predictions Come True? KSR, eBay, and
The Real Impact on PatentLicense Negotiations,INTELL. PROP. TODAY, July 2008, at 8.
KSR
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In MedImmune, Ine. v. Genenteeh, Inc. 217 the Supreme Court ruled that a patent
licensee is not required to terminate its license in order to seek a declaratory
judgment that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. 218 The ruling
also forced the Federal Circuit to abandon its "reasonable apprehension of suit"
requirement for obtaining standing to bring a declaratory judgment action. 219 This
ruling makes it much easier for parties, particularly licensees, to challenge the
220
validity of patents.
In In re Biiski,22l the Federal Circuit stiffened the requirements for patenting
222
business methods under 35 U.S.C. § 101, which defines patentable subject matter.
The court ruled that the only applicable standard for determining patentability
under § 101 is the "machine-or-transformation" test, whereby a method or process is
only patentable if it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus or transforms an
article into a different state or thing.223 Applying this as the sole test under § 101
will make it much more difficult to obtain patents on business methods and
224
processes.
In summary, the above decisions have: (1) made it easier for the USPTO and the
Federal Courts to invalidate or refuse to issue patents; 225 (2) made it easier for
aggrieved parties to challenge patents in court;226 (3) made the risks of a finding of an
infringement significantly lower. 227 In light of these fundamental changes, perhaps a
more prudent course of action at this point is to see how the patent system will
function on a going forward basis.
Indeed, if there is more work to be done on improving patents, perhaps the
solution is to increase the resources of the USPTO so that it can effectively apply the
rigorous standards for validity and patentability by KSR and Biiski. The USPTO has
a backlog of 750,000 applications that is growing at a rate of 200,000 applications
each year. 228 As a consequence of the backlog, pendency for patent applications is
alarmingly high; the average pendency for reexamination proceedings in the USPTO

549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Id. at 137.
219 Id. at 132-34
220 Id. at 134-35.
221 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
222 Id. at 961, 966.
223 Id. at 961 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972)).
224 See Janine Robben, Patently Obvious: Patent Lawyers Look at What is-And Isn'tPatentable, 69 OR. ST. B. BULL. 18, 23-24 (2009) (recognizing the limitation 35 U.S.C. § 101 now
places on computer and software patents).
225 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007); Bilski, 545 F.3d at 943.
226 Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007).
227 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497
F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007), eart, denied sub nom. Convolve, Inc. v. Seagate Tech., LLC, 128 S. Ct.
1445.
217
218

228

U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENTS AND HOW TO GET ONE: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK 14

(Cosimo 2006) (2000) ("Patent applications are received at the rate of over 200,000 per year."); see
Stephen Barr, Backlog Quotas Overwhelm Patent Examine±'8, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2007, at DI
(indicating that the current backlog as of Oct. 8, 2007 was approximately 760,000, and that if the
USPTO worked only on the current backlog of patent applications, it would take two years to clear
it).
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now stands at 24 months. 229 There is little if anything in the present patent reform
package to help the USPTO with what it really needs: the resources to effectively
examine patents in a reasonable period of time. 230 On the contrary, the proposed
23 1
reforms will merely exacerbate the difficulties the Office already faces.
A number of groups have begun to speak out about the need to help the USPTO
succeed. 232 The most urgent need is to provide adequate and permanent funding to
the Office for hiring, retention and training.2 33 Beyond that there are a number of
proposed rule changes that could be implemented to assist the Office in examining
and issuing high quality patents. 234 These proposals for improving the Office would
require a legislative change of a kind much different than the recently proposed
Patent Reform Acts, and should be examined.
The need to assist the Office also has to be embraced by the users of the Office.
As with patent reform, every group with an opinion also has its own agenda.23 5 This
236
has made producing a workable, cohesive legislative product almost impossible.
However, all user groups should agree on the need to assist the Office in issuing high
quality patents in a timely fashion. This, more than anything, will raise the
confidence of the American public in the patent system and help to energize
innovation.
Finally, if Congress is intent on passing patent reform, continued success of
university innovation will require a change in the provisions for remedies and post
237
grant review to continue the current incentives to license rather than infringe.
Namely, there needs to be a continued presumption of validity for issued U.S. patents
as well as significant remedies for the patent owner in the event his or her patent is
infringed. 238 This could be most easily accomplished by dropping the remedies
23 9
provisions and eliminating the second window of post-grant review.

22) U.S.

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE INCOMING

ADMINISTRATION REGARDING THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 3 (2008) [hereinafter
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RECOMMENDATIONS], available at http://ipo.informz.net/ipo/data/images/

14492-patentoffice-fm4_12.25.08.pdf.
230 See id.
at 3-4 (acknowledging the patent reform legislation as assigning new
responsibilities to the USPTO).
231 Id. at 3.
232 See FTC REPORT, supra note 12, at 54-55 (expressing higher funding and more examiners
would result in higher quality patents).
233 Id.
2:31See

id. Executive Summary, at 7-17; CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra

note 229, at 4.
235 Soo discussion supra INTRODUCTION.
236 See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. (2008) (terminating in the
Senate); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007) (as passed House of
Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007) (terminating
in the Senate).
237 So discussion supra Part III.B.2.
238

Id.
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TABLE 1. COMPARISON OF SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF
2007 AND THE PATENT REFORM ACT OF 2008.

Firstto-File

Section 2: Changes the U.S. system from first to invent to
first to file.
* Eliminates interference proceedings and introduces
new "derivation" proceedings to determine whether
the first to file is the true inventor. § 103(h), (i), and
*

"

"

Applicant's own publication or disclosure, and
disclosure by others based on information obtained
from the applicant, will not constitute prior art within
one year of filing. § 102(a)(1).
Measures prior art from the filing date of the
application and includes all art "available to the
public." § 102(a)(1).
Contains a prior art exception for subject matter
invented pursuant to a joint research agreement.
§ 102(b).

Section 2:
Similar to S.
1145.
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Section 4: Codifies method for
determining reasonable royalty.
" The judge determines
whether the basis for
calculation will be "entire
market value," "marketplace
licensing" or, if neither
applies, the economic value
attributable to the claimed
invention's specific
contribution over the prior
art. § 284(c).
* Allows the court to consider
other relevant factors under
applicable law in
determining reasonable
royalty. § 284(c).
* Detailed criteria for
establishing willful
infringement. § 284(c).

Section 4: Codifies method for
determining a reasonable royalty
based on methodologies distinct from
S. 1145.
* Defines "reasonable royalty"
based on a "hypothetical
negotiation" between the
infringer and claimant. § 284(b).
* Allows the court or jury to
consider any relevant factors in
determining reasonable royalty.
§ 284(c).
* With limited exceptions,
prohibits the use of "a standard
or average ratio for the division
of profits, an industry average
rate for royalties, or other
methods that are not based on
the particular benefits or
advantages of the use of the
invention." § 284(d).
" Exception if the invention's use is
the primary reason for market
demand of the product or process,
there is already an established
royalty, an industry average is
used to confirm an estimate of
reasonable royalty, or no other
method is reasonably available.
§ 284(d)(1)-(4).
" Strictly limits the use of royalties
for comparable patents to
determine reasonable royalty.
§ 284(e).
" Bifurcation of liability and
damages trials if requested.
§ 284(g).
" Provides rules for the
presentation of expert testimony
regarding a reasonable royalty.
§ 284(h) & § 299A.
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Section 5: Repeals interpartes
reexamination procedures and
enables any third party to
challenge a patent by filing
petition for Post-Grant Review.
§ 303(a)-(c).
* Provides for a "first window"
challenge filed within 12
months of patent issue.
§ 322(1).
* Provides for a "second
window" challenge filed at
any time with consent of the
patent owner or within 12
months of receiving notice of
infringement if the
challenger can show a
likelihood of significant
economic harm from the
continued existence of the
patent claim(s). § 322(2)-(3).
* Eliminates the presumption
of patent validity during the
first window, but retains it
during the second window.
§ 331.
* Does not limit basis of
challenge. § 322(2); § 323.
* Requires challenger to prove
invalidity by a
preponderance of the
evidence in the first window,
and clear and convincing
evidence in the second
window. § 331.
" Contains an estoppel
provision. § 337-338.

Section 5: Similarities to S. 1145
include
" Repeal of interpartes
reexamination procedures.
§ 303(b).
* Two windows for challenging
patents. § 321(b)-(c).
* Preponderance of the evidence
standard in the first window.
§ 331(b).
* Clear and convincing evidence
standard in the second window.
§ 331(b).
Differences from S. 1145 include:
* The first window requires the
challenger to have a "substantial
economic interest adverse to the
patent," and expires within 9
months of patent issue. § 321(a)(b).
" The second window challenge may
be filed at any time within 9
months of the grant of patent or
the date of termination of a first
window proceeding, requires a
"substantial economic interest
adverse to the patent," and only
allows for a challenge based on
novelty and obviousness in light of
printed publications, patents, and
patent applications. § 321(a) and
(c).
* The presumption of patent validity
applies to the first and second
windows. § 331.
* Limits exparte reexaminations to
actions by a patentee. § 303(a).
" More stringent estoppel provision.
§ 322(d).

